VG.
Straight up

Professor of Economics · University of Münster

Vitali
Gretschko

I design the rules of markets. My research covers auction theory, mechanism design, and contracts. I prove theorems, run lab experiments, and work on billion-euro spectrum and energy auctions in the field.

Chair of Sustainable Market Design Consulting: open to new projects →
Portrait of Vitali Gretschko
Endorsements from beyond the grave (fictional, but accurate about the papers)
“I doubled the size of a nation in a private negotiation and told Congress afterwards. Gretschko & Wambach explain precisely why it worked: shielded from public scrutiny, a negotiator can strike the deal of the millennium. Their advice for everyone who is being watched: hold an auction.”
Thomas Jefferson 1743–1826 · third President of the United States, buyer of Louisiana on “Procurement under Public Scrutiny” · RAND 2016 →
“Monsieur Jefferson believes he won? I kept his men talking until the price suited me. The experiment of Fugger, Gillen, Gretschko, Kokott & Riehm confirms my method: communication raises procurement prices, even when the buyers are seasoned professionals. Sellers, always insist on a chat.”
Napoleon Bonaparte 1769–1821 · Emperor of the French, seller of Louisiana on “Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Role of Communication” →
“Six marriage contracts, and not one of them stable under renegotiation. Had I read Gretschko & Wambach on designing outcomes that no renegotiation can overturn, England might have been spared a schism, and two of my queens their heads.”
Henry VIII 1491–1547 · King of England, serial renegotiator on “Stable Contracts under Renegotiation” · R&R, JPE →
“Know your enemy, I wrote. But when you cannot even know what your enemy believes, bid as Gretschko & Mass instruct: plan against the worst-case belief and you cannot be ambushed. The supreme art of bidding is surviving your own ignorance.”
Sun Tzu c. 544–496 BC · general, author of The Art of War on “Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions” · Theoretical Economics 2024 →
“I studied birds for twenty years and finished four paintings. Gretschko & Rajko proved in the laboratory what my patrons always suspected: people acquire far more information than could ever pay off. Their bidders paid to know things of no use to them. I felt seen.”
Leonardo da Vinci 1452–1519 · polymath, notorious over-researcher on “Excess Information Acquisition in Auctions” · Exp. Econ. 2015 →
“All my life they whispered that the Emperor favored Mozart. Under imitation perfection (the simple rule of Mass, Fugger, Gretschko & Wambach), anyone may copy the favorite’s offer and must be treated exactly the same. Where was this mechanism in 1781?”
Antonio Salieri 1750–1825 · imperial court composer, allegedly overlooked on “Imitation Perfection” · AEJ: Microeconomics 2020 →
“Four years on my back painting a ceiling for a Pope who paid when it pleased him. Gretschko & Pollrich design multi-period procurement that survives exactly such incomplete contracts. Had Julius II committed to their mechanism, I might have painted him a second one.”
Michelangelo 1475–1564 · sculptor, reluctant ceiling contractor on “Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement” · Management Science 2022 →
“They named the megahertz after me, then sold it for billions. The autopsy of Germany’s 2015 auction by Bichler, Gretschko & Janssen taught me how bidders bargain with one another using nothing but their bids. Wireless telegraphy indeed.”
Heinrich Hertz 1857–1894 · physicist, unit of frequency on “Bargaining in Spectrum Auctions” · Telecom. Policy 2017 →
“In my country they sell flowers by a falling clock: no time to think, only to stop it. Gretschko & Wambach ask when a bidder in a descending auction should pause and learn what the lot is truly worth to her. I sold one painting in my lifetime. Clearly, I stopped too seldom.”
Vincent van Gogh 1853–1890 · painter, posthumous market phenomenon on “Information Acquisition during a Descending Auction” · Econ. Theory 2014 →
“Athens ruled that my teaching had externalities and sanctioned me accordingly. Riehm, Fugger, Gillen, Gretschko & Werner measure, in the field, when social norms and sanctions truly keep people out of markets their neighbors despise. The hemlock, I maintain, was disproportionate.”
Socrates 470–399 BC · philosopher, sanctioned by popular vote on “Social Norms, Sanctions, and Conditional Entry” · J. Public Econ. 2022 →
01

Selected publications

Theoretical Economics

Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions

with Helene Mass · 19(1), 61–93 (2024)

Management Science

Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement

with Martin Pollrich · 68(7), 5146–5161 (2022)

Journal of Public Economics

Social Norms, Sanctions, and Conditional Entry in Markets with Externalities

with Tobias Riehm, Nicolas Fugger, Philippe Gillen, Peter Werner · 212, 104701 (2022)

Browse the full publication list ↓

02

About

I am an economist working on auctions, mechanism design, and contract theory. I also take these tools out of the seminar room and into working markets.

Since 2023 I have held the Chair of Sustainable Market Design at the University of Münster. Before that I was Professor of Market Design at the University of Mannheim (tenured 2023) and headed the Market Design research unit at ZEW Mannheim, where I built a group that took market design from theorems to policy.

My research asks how the rules of a market shape what happens inside it: when auctions beat negotiations, how contracts survive renegotiation, what information bidders should and should not acquire, and how to prevent discrimination in procurement. It appears in Management Science, AEJ: Microeconomics, Theoretical Economics, the RAND Journal of Economics, and the Journal of Public Economics, among others.

The same tools work outside academia. I have advised bidders and regulators in spectrum auctions across Europe, helped design allocation schemes for food banks and kindergarten places, and consulted for industry on strategic procurement and negotiation design. I trained as a mathematician in Münster and earned my doctorate in economics in Cologne. Research stays took me to Yale, FU Berlin, and Bonn.

Recognition

  • Capital: “Top 40 unter 40”, 2021
  • Capital: Top 10 young economists, 2021
  • WirtschaftsWoche: “Next Generation”
  • Fulbright alumnus (Yale)
  • Liaison professor, Studienstiftung

Selected funders

NWO · BMBF · Kopernikus / SynErgie (I & II) · Volkswagen Stiftung · Leibniz Association · BMEL · European Commission (DG REFORM)

Trajectory

  1. 2023–
    Professor of Economics
    Chair of Sustainable Market Design, University of Münster
  2. 2017–23
    Professor of Market Design
    University of Mannheim · tenured 2023
  3. 2016–23
    Head, Market Design unit
    ZEW (Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research)
  4. 2014–16
    Akademischer Rat
    University of Cologne
  5. 2013–14
    Project manager
    TWS Partners (market design & negotiation strategy)
  6. 2011–12
    Visiting researcher
    Yale University (Fulbright)
  7. 2009–12
    Doctorate in Economics
    University of Cologne
  8. 2008–09
    IT consultant
    Accenture
  9. 2002–07
    Diploma in Mathematics
    University of Münster
03

Research

Journal articles

Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions

with Helene Mass · Theoretical Economics, 19(1), 61–93 (2024)

Social Norms, Sanctions, and Conditional Entry in Markets with Externalities: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment

with Tobias Riehm, Nicolas Fugger, Philippe Gillen, Peter Werner · Journal of Public Economics, 212, 104701 (2022)

Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement

with Martin Pollrich · Management Science, 68(7), 5146–5161 (2022)

Information Design in Sequential Procurement

with Nicolas Fugger, Martin Pollrich · Games and Economic Behavior, 135, 79–85 (2022)

Imitation Perfection — A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement

with Helene Mass, Nicolas Fugger, Achim Wambach · American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 12(3), 189–245 (2020)

A Procurement Mechanism to Assign Refugee Quotas

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 175(1), 53–57 (2019)

Bargaining in Spectrum Auctions: A Review of the German Auction in 2015

with Martin Bichler, Maarten Janssen · Telecommunications Policy, 41(5–6), 325–340 (2017)

Pre-Auction or Post-Auction Qualification?

with Philippe Gillen, Alexander Rasch · Economic Theory Bulletin, 5(2), 139–150 (2017)

Procurement under Public Scrutiny: Auctions versus Negotiations

with Achim Wambach · RAND Journal of Economics, 47(4), 914–934 (2016)

Excess Information Acquisition in Auctions

with Alexander Rajko · Experimental Economics, 18(3), 335–355 (2015)

Information Acquisition during a Descending Auction

with Achim Wambach · Economic Theory, 55(3), 731–751 (2014)

On the Strictly Descending Multi-Unit Auction

with Alexander Rasch, Achim Wambach · Journal of Mathematical Economics, 50, 79–85 (2014)

Working papers

Stable Contracts under Renegotiation

with Achim Wambach · revise & resubmit, Journal of Political Economy · draft October 2026

Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Role of Communication in an Experiment with Procurement Managers

with Nicolas Fugger, Philippe Gillen, Gian-Marco Kokott, Tobias Riehm · ZEW Discussion Paper 25-039 (2025)

An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism with Covert Information Acquisition

with Jasmina Simon · ZEW Discussion Paper 24-081 (2024)

Sequential Procurement with Limited Commitment

with Nicolas Fugger, Martin Pollrich · ZEW Discussion Paper 19-030 (2019)

Common Values and the Coase Conjecture: Inefficiencies in Frictionless Contract (Re-)Negotiation

with Achim Wambach · VfS Annual Conference (2015)

Work in progress

Large Language Models and Dominant Strategies

with Jasmina Simon · work in progress

Auctions for Green Investment

with Philip Zilke · work in progress

Book chapters

Nachhaltige Geschäftsmodelle im Einkauf: Eine Fallstudie

with Florian Haas · in CSR und Geschäftsmodelle, Springer Gabler, 363–376 (2018)

Bidding Complexities in the Combinatorial Clock Auction

with Stephan Knapek, Achim Wambach · in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design (eds. M. Bichler, J. Goeree), Cambridge University Press, 731–747 (2017)

Policy & reports

Optimierung des Verhandlungsgebots auf dem Telekommunikationsmarkt

with Axel Ockenfels, Achim Wambach · Wirtschaftsdienst, 104(11), 794–799 (2024)

Empfehlungen für das Marktdesign zur Befüllung der Gasspeicher

with Axel Ockenfels · Wirtschaftsdienst, 103(2), 105–111 (2023)

Bewertung des Gasauktionsmodells

with Julius Ecke, Tim Höfer · FES diskurs, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2022)

Electricity Market Design 2030–2050: Moving Towards Implementation

SynErgie project group · White paper (2021)

Stellungnahme zu Grundsätzen und Szenarien für die Bereitstellung der Mobilfunkfrequenzen

with Achim Wambach · ZEW-Kurzexpertise 21-07, response to the Bundesnetzagentur’s 2021 scenario paper (2021)

Ein flexibles Vergütungskonzept für Mediziner hilft, Herdenimmunität gegen COVID-19 zu erreichen

with Marion Ott · ZEW policy brief 21-03 (2021)

Electricity Spot Market Design 2030–2050

SynErgie project group · White paper (2021)

Die Regeln machen den Unterschied: Marktdesign

with Thilo Klein, Achim Wambach · Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt), 48(4), 22–28 (2019)

Beschaffungskonflikte: Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer

with Nicolas Fugger, Philippe Gillen · Wirtschaftsdienst, 96(9), 626–627 (2016)

Spectrum Aggregation Limits in Auctions with Spectrum below 1 GHz: The European Experience

with Stephan Knapek, Achim Wambach · filed with the FCC (2013)

All publications on Google Scholar →

04

Consulting & policy

I have spent fifteen years putting mechanism design to work for bidders, regulators, ministries, and nonprofits. Open to new projects.

Spectrum auctions

Advised bidders and regulators in frequency auctions in Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, and Georgia, plus an FCC filing on aggregation limits for the US incentive auction.

Energy & climate

Advised one bidder each in Germany’s coal phase-out auction and in UK & US offshore-wind license auctions. Also worked on market design for gas storage and the 2030–2050 electricity market, and contributed to a 2022 study on electricity market design for Zukunft Gas.

Industry & procurement

Game theory, negotiation strategy, and strategic procurement for BMW, Porsche, BOSCH, Mann + Hummel, Cimpress, and other major companies.

Public sector & social markets

Helped design allocation schemes for food donations (with Tafel Deutschland) and for kindergarten places in German municipalities. Also worked on public construction procurement (BBSR) and digital identities (Federal Chancellery).

Governments & institutions

Bulk purchase of school books for Brazil’s public schools, reform of the Swedish Public Employment Service (EU DG REFORM, with the OECD), and work for the Georgian telecom regulator.

Media rights

Advised a bidder in the 2016 auction of Bundesliga TV transmission rights, where the choice of auction format can be worth hundreds of millions.

05

Teaching & advising

University of Münster

  • Game TheorySS 2025
  • Introduction to MicroeconomicsWS 2025/26
  • Seminar: Experiments with Artificial IntelligenceWS 2025/26
  • Resource EconomicsWS 2023–26
  • Environmental Economics + SeminarSS 2024, SS 2025
  • Strategic ProcurementWS 2024/25

Earlier I taught Market Design, Auction Theory, and Game Theory at Mannheim and Cologne (Bachelor, Master, PhD).

Executive education

Courses on negotiation and auction design for managers at BMW, BOSCH, Infineon, Schaeffler, Mann + Hummel, Cimpress, and TWS Partners.

Beyond the lecture hall

Liaison professor for the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes; referee for the AER, the Journal of Political Economy, Econometrica, Management Science, and 12+ other journals; co-organizer of the Virtual Market Design Seminar (2020–2024).

PhD students

  • Philip Zilkesince 2021
  • Jasmina Simonsince 2020
  • Chang Liu2021–2025 → Central University of Finance and Economics
  • Tobias Riehm2017–2022 → strategy consulting
06

In the media

On spectrum auctions, market transparency, vaccination incentives, and why the rules of the game decide who wins it.

German press

  • CapitalJunge Elite 2021: Die Top 10 Nachwuchsökonomen
  • CapitalTop 40 unter 40: Capital kürt die Junge Elite 2021
  • HandelsblattWie Prämien die Corona-Impfungen deutlich beschleunigen könnten
  • HandelsblattBieterschlacht der Telkoriesen
  • FAZVon der Analyse zum Design der Märkte
  • SüddeutscheFinale im Milliardenspiel
  • SüddeutscheMobiles Internet für alle, aber richtig
  • Welt„Kevin Kühnert hat das richtige Gespür“
  • WiWoVorschlag von Ökonomen: So erreichen wir Herdenimmunität
  • WiWoDie Mär von der totalen Transparenz
  • WiWoPlötzlich nützlich — Der Volkswirt
  • TagesspiegelDie Lizenz zum Schnellsurfen
  • TagesspiegelGasauktionen helfen nicht beim Sparen
  • Börsen-ZeitungWarum eine zeitnahe Mobilfunkauktion Vorzüge hat
  • BildWas wurde eigentlich aus der 5G-Auktion?

French press

  • Le Monde« Dans une société qui utilise les enchères au quotidien, l’originalité des travaux de Paul Milgrom et Robert Wilson nous est précieuse »
  • Les ÉchosDroits TV du football français : un coûteux hors-jeu
  • Les ÉchosL’attribution des fréquences 5G, une déception sans surprise
  • Les ÉchosMéthode d’attribution des fréquences 5G : des choix discutables
  • Les ÉchosAllemagne : ces enchères 5G qui n’en finissent plus…
  • Les ÉchosEn Allemagne, la 5G a déjà rapporté plus de 5 milliards

“Die Regeln machen den Unterschied.”

The thread that runs from WiSt 2019 to today
07

Contact

For research, consulting, or teaching inquiries:

vitali.gretschko@wiwi.uni-muenster.de

Office

Chair of Sustainable Market Design
University of Münster
Am Stadtgraben 9, Room 7
48143 Münster, Germany
+49 251 83-25007

Profiles

Curriculum vitae

The full academic CV: positions, funding, talks, and service.

Download CV (PDF)