Theoretical Economics
Professor of Economics · University of Münster
Vitali
Gretschko
I design the rules of markets. My research covers auction theory, mechanism design, and contracts. I prove theorems, run lab experiments, and work on billion-euro spectrum and energy auctions in the field.
“I doubled the size of a nation in a private negotiation and told Congress afterwards. Gretschko & Wambach explain precisely why it worked: shielded from public scrutiny, a negotiator can strike the deal of the millennium. Their advice for everyone who is being watched: hold an auction.”
“Monsieur Jefferson believes he won? I kept his men talking until the price suited me. The experiment of Fugger, Gillen, Gretschko, Kokott & Riehm confirms my method: communication raises procurement prices, even when the buyers are seasoned professionals. Sellers, always insist on a chat.”
“Six marriage contracts, and not one of them stable under renegotiation. Had I read Gretschko & Wambach on designing outcomes that no renegotiation can overturn, England might have been spared a schism, and two of my queens their heads.”
“Know your enemy, I wrote. But when you cannot even know what your enemy believes, bid as Gretschko & Mass instruct: plan against the worst-case belief and you cannot be ambushed. The supreme art of bidding is surviving your own ignorance.”
“I studied birds for twenty years and finished four paintings. Gretschko & Rajko proved in the laboratory what my patrons always suspected: people acquire far more information than could ever pay off. Their bidders paid to know things of no use to them. I felt seen.”
“All my life they whispered that the Emperor favored Mozart. Under imitation perfection (the simple rule of Mass, Fugger, Gretschko & Wambach), anyone may copy the favorite’s offer and must be treated exactly the same. Where was this mechanism in 1781?”
“Four years on my back painting a ceiling for a Pope who paid when it pleased him. Gretschko & Pollrich design multi-period procurement that survives exactly such incomplete contracts. Had Julius II committed to their mechanism, I might have painted him a second one.”
“They named the megahertz after me, then sold it for billions. The autopsy of Germany’s 2015 auction by Bichler, Gretschko & Janssen taught me how bidders bargain with one another using nothing but their bids. Wireless telegraphy indeed.”
“In my country they sell flowers by a falling clock: no time to think, only to stop it. Gretschko & Wambach ask when a bidder in a descending auction should pause and learn what the lot is truly worth to her. I sold one painting in my lifetime. Clearly, I stopped too seldom.”
“Athens ruled that my teaching had externalities and sanctioned me accordingly. Riehm, Fugger, Gillen, Gretschko & Werner measure, in the field, when social norms and sanctions truly keep people out of markets their neighbors despise. The hemlock, I maintain, was disproportionate.”
Selected publications
Management Science
Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement
Journal of Public Economics
Social Norms, Sanctions, and Conditional Entry in Markets with Externalities
About
I am an economist working on auctions, mechanism design, and contract theory. I also take these tools out of the seminar room and into working markets.
Since 2023 I have held the Chair of Sustainable Market Design at the University of Münster. Before that I was Professor of Market Design at the University of Mannheim (tenured 2023) and headed the Market Design research unit at ZEW Mannheim, where I built a group that took market design from theorems to policy.
My research asks how the rules of a market shape what happens inside it: when auctions beat negotiations, how contracts survive renegotiation, what information bidders should and should not acquire, and how to prevent discrimination in procurement. It appears in Management Science, AEJ: Microeconomics, Theoretical Economics, the RAND Journal of Economics, and the Journal of Public Economics, among others.
The same tools work outside academia. I have advised bidders and regulators in spectrum auctions across Europe, helped design allocation schemes for food banks and kindergarten places, and consulted for industry on strategic procurement and negotiation design. I trained as a mathematician in Münster and earned my doctorate in economics in Cologne. Research stays took me to Yale, FU Berlin, and Bonn.
Recognition
- Capital: “Top 40 unter 40”, 2021
- Capital: Top 10 young economists, 2021
- WirtschaftsWoche: “Next Generation”
- Fulbright alumnus (Yale)
- Liaison professor, Studienstiftung
Selected funders
NWO · BMBF · Kopernikus / SynErgie (I & II) · Volkswagen Stiftung · Leibniz Association · BMEL · European Commission (DG REFORM)
Trajectory
- 2023–
Professor of Economics
Chair of Sustainable Market Design, University of Münster - 2017–23
Professor of Market Design
University of Mannheim · tenured 2023 - 2016–23
Head, Market Design unit
ZEW (Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research) - 2014–16
Akademischer Rat
University of Cologne - 2013–14
Project manager
TWS Partners (market design & negotiation strategy) - 2011–12
Visiting researcher
Yale University (Fulbright) - 2009–12
Doctorate in Economics
University of Cologne - 2008–09
IT consultant
Accenture - 2002–07
Diploma in Mathematics
University of Münster
Research
Revise & resubmit at the Journal of Political Economy
Stable Contracts under Renegotiation
We study a principal contracting with a privately informed agent, where any contract is subject to renegotiation. Rather than specifying a renegotiation game, we propose conditions that the set of terminal outcomes of renegotiation must satisfy. Applied to contracting without commitment, our framework bounds the principal’s loss from lacking commitment by characterizing the largest payoff she can obtain when the terminal outcomes must be in a stable set.
Working paper · ZEW DP 25-039 (2025)
Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Role of Communication
In a controlled experiment that included experienced procurement professionals, communication between buyers and suppliers raises prices, so auctions without communication get buyers better deals.
PaperIn progress
Large Language Models and Dominant Strategies
with Jasmina Simon, on how the newest bidders in town play the oldest games.
AI × economics resources →Journal articles
Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions
Social Norms, Sanctions, and Conditional Entry in Markets with Externalities: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment
Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement
Information Design in Sequential Procurement
Imitation Perfection — A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement
A Procurement Mechanism to Assign Refugee Quotas
Bargaining in Spectrum Auctions: A Review of the German Auction in 2015
Pre-Auction or Post-Auction Qualification?
Procurement under Public Scrutiny: Auctions versus Negotiations
Excess Information Acquisition in Auctions
Information Acquisition during a Descending Auction
On the Strictly Descending Multi-Unit Auction
Working papers
Stable Contracts under Renegotiation
Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Role of Communication in an Experiment with Procurement Managers
An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism with Covert Information Acquisition
Sequential Procurement with Limited Commitment
Common Values and the Coase Conjecture: Inefficiencies in Frictionless Contract (Re-)Negotiation
Work in progress
Large Language Models and Dominant Strategies
Auctions for Green Investment
Book chapters
Nachhaltige Geschäftsmodelle im Einkauf: Eine Fallstudie
Bidding Complexities in the Combinatorial Clock Auction
Policy & reports
Optimierung des Verhandlungsgebots auf dem Telekommunikationsmarkt
Empfehlungen für das Marktdesign zur Befüllung der Gasspeicher
Bewertung des Gasauktionsmodells
Electricity Market Design 2030–2050: Moving Towards Implementation
Stellungnahme zu Grundsätzen und Szenarien für die Bereitstellung der Mobilfunkfrequenzen
Ein flexibles Vergütungskonzept für Mediziner hilft, Herdenimmunität gegen COVID-19 zu erreichen
Electricity Spot Market Design 2030–2050
Die Regeln machen den Unterschied: Marktdesign
Beschaffungskonflikte: Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer
Spectrum Aggregation Limits in Auctions with Spectrum below 1 GHz: The European Experience
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Consulting & policy
I have spent fifteen years putting mechanism design to work for bidders, regulators, ministries, and nonprofits. Open to new projects.
Spectrum auctions
Advised bidders and regulators in frequency auctions in Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, and Georgia, plus an FCC filing on aggregation limits for the US incentive auction.
Energy & climate
Advised one bidder each in Germany’s coal phase-out auction and in UK & US offshore-wind license auctions. Also worked on market design for gas storage and the 2030–2050 electricity market, and contributed to a 2022 study on electricity market design for Zukunft Gas.
Industry & procurement
Game theory, negotiation strategy, and strategic procurement for BMW, Porsche, BOSCH, Mann + Hummel, Cimpress, and other major companies.
Public sector & social markets
Helped design allocation schemes for food donations (with Tafel Deutschland) and for kindergarten places in German municipalities. Also worked on public construction procurement (BBSR) and digital identities (Federal Chancellery).
Governments & institutions
Bulk purchase of school books for Brazil’s public schools, reform of the Swedish Public Employment Service (EU DG REFORM, with the OECD), and work for the Georgian telecom regulator.
Media rights
Advised a bidder in the 2016 auction of Bundesliga TV transmission rights, where the choice of auction format can be worth hundreds of millions.
Teaching & advising
University of Münster
- Game TheorySS 2025
- Introduction to MicroeconomicsWS 2025/26
- Seminar: Experiments with Artificial IntelligenceWS 2025/26
- Resource EconomicsWS 2023–26
- Environmental Economics + SeminarSS 2024, SS 2025
- Strategic ProcurementWS 2024/25
Earlier I taught Market Design, Auction Theory, and Game Theory at Mannheim and Cologne (Bachelor, Master, PhD).
Executive education
Courses on negotiation and auction design for managers at BMW, BOSCH, Infineon, Schaeffler, Mann + Hummel, Cimpress, and TWS Partners.
Beyond the lecture hall
Liaison professor for the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes; referee for the AER, the Journal of Political Economy, Econometrica, Management Science, and 12+ other journals; co-organizer of the Virtual Market Design Seminar (2020–2024).
PhD students
- Philip Zilkesince 2021
- Jasmina Simonsince 2020
- Chang Liu2021–2025 → Central University of Finance and Economics
- Tobias Riehm2017–2022 → strategy consulting
In the media
On spectrum auctions, market transparency, vaccination incentives, and why the rules of the game decide who wins it.
German press
- CapitalJunge Elite 2021: Die Top 10 Nachwuchsökonomen
- CapitalTop 40 unter 40: Capital kürt die Junge Elite 2021
- HandelsblattWie Prämien die Corona-Impfungen deutlich beschleunigen könnten
- HandelsblattBieterschlacht der Telkoriesen
- FAZVon der Analyse zum Design der Märkte
- SüddeutscheFinale im Milliardenspiel
- SüddeutscheMobiles Internet für alle, aber richtig
- Welt„Kevin Kühnert hat das richtige Gespür“
- WiWoVorschlag von Ökonomen: So erreichen wir Herdenimmunität
- WiWoDie Mär von der totalen Transparenz
- WiWoPlötzlich nützlich — Der Volkswirt
- TagesspiegelDie Lizenz zum Schnellsurfen
- TagesspiegelGasauktionen helfen nicht beim Sparen
- Börsen-ZeitungWarum eine zeitnahe Mobilfunkauktion Vorzüge hat
- BildWas wurde eigentlich aus der 5G-Auktion?
French press
- Le Monde« Dans une société qui utilise les enchères au quotidien, l’originalité des travaux de Paul Milgrom et Robert Wilson nous est précieuse »
- Les ÉchosDroits TV du football français : un coûteux hors-jeu
- Les ÉchosL’attribution des fréquences 5G, une déception sans surprise
- Les ÉchosMéthode d’attribution des fréquences 5G : des choix discutables
- Les ÉchosAllemagne : ces enchères 5G qui n’en finissent plus…
- Les ÉchosEn Allemagne, la 5G a déjà rapporté plus de 5 milliards
“Die Regeln machen den Unterschied.”
The thread that runs from WiSt 2019 to todayContact
For research, consulting, or teaching inquiries:
vitali.gretschko@Office
Chair of Sustainable Market Design
University of Münster
Am Stadtgraben 9, Room 7
48143 Münster,
Germany
+49 251 83-25007